Preventing Torture: Implications of Cat General Common No. 2: Keynote by Sachs, Albie
City University of New York Law Review 
Volume 11 Issue 2 
Summer 2008 
Preventing Torture: Implications of Cat General Common No. 2: 
Keynote 
Albie Sachs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Albie Sachs, Preventing Torture: Implications of Cat General Common No. 2: Keynote, 11 N.Y. City L. Rev. 
201 (2008). 
Available at: 10.31641/clr110203 
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more 
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu. 
PREVENTING TORTURE: IMPLICATIONS OF
CAT GENERAL COMMENT NO. 2: KEYNOTE
Justice Albie Sachs*
I was 39 years old, quietly teaching law in Southampton Uni-
versity, when I discovered I was a terrorist.  I was in exile in En-
gland and had been invited to attend a conference on South Africa
organized by Yale University’s Contemporary History Department.
Although I’d just gotten a passport, it was clear to me that I
wouldn’t be able to go to the United States because, according to
the U.S. State Department, I was a “terrorist.”  Why was I a terror-
ist?  I was a terrorist because I belonged to the African National
Congress (“ANC”).  The ANC had for many decades been engaged
in a non-violent struggle against Apartheid in South Africa.  The
majority of South Africans didn’t have the vote, didn’t have rights
at all, and their political leaders were driven underground.  It was
either fight back or remain silent, and the ANC chose to fight back.
The Commander-in-Chief of the armed wing of the ANC was a cer-
tain Nelson Mandela: terrorist number one.
So, simply because I happened to be a member of the ANC, I
was by definition a terrorist.  That was on a Monday.  On Tuesday,
the pro-ANC lobby group in Washington D.C. managed to better
the lobby group that had been supporting the South African gov-
ernment, and I was no longer a terrorist.  And so I was able to visit
the U.S.
We had been called many, many nasty things.  But to be called
a terrorist wasn’t simply a label that was undignified, that distorted
the very nature and character of what we were struggling for—it
implicitly gave some kind of assistance to protecting Apartheid.
The term “terrorist” had intense meaning in South Africa.  The
people fighting for freedom were labeled terrorists, and a panoply
of laws had been introduced to justify detention without trial of
* Justice Sachs is a member of South Africa’s Constitutional Court.  He has a dis-
tinguished career as a human rights activist.  In 1966 he went into exile, and after
spending eleven years studying and teaching law in England he worked for a further
eleven years in Mozambique as law professor and legal researcher.  In 1990 he re-
turned home and, as a member of the Constitutional Committee and the National
Executive of the African National Congress, took an active part in the negotiations,
which led to South Africa becoming a constitutional democracy.  After the first demo-
cratic election in 1994 he was appointed by President Nelson Mandela to serve on the
newly established Constitutional Court.
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alleged terrorists.  The minute you were detained, you were denied
the right to a trial, to access to lawyers and family, and thrown into
solitary confinement under the control of the security police.
On a spring day in 1963, as I was entering my chambers, about
six or seven cops emerged from behind pillars to detain me.  It was
as you see in the movies, police suddenly there, and I was whisked
off to prison.  So this is what it’s like: I’m in a box.  There’s a mat
on the floor.  The windows are high, you can’t see out.  And this is
my new place.  Every person involved in the freedom struggle won-
ders: when I’m locked up one day in solitary confinement, what
will it be like?  How will I be?  Will I manage?  And it turned out to
be far more punishing, and far more difficult than I’d ever
thought.  I’d believed one would simply be strong and brave and
able to withstand everything they try to do to you.  You’re fighting a
just cause, you’re a human being with dignity and integrity—you
don’t give way.  And yet, the character of solitary confinement is
such that it reaches deep, deep, deep inside you—it’s not just a
question of will and rationality.  Your body and soul fight your will.
You stare at your toes, you stare at the wall; you stare at the
wall, you stare at your toes.  You don’t know how long this is going
to go on.  Human beings are born to live in communities and be
part of society.  We talk and we think.  Even when we want solitude,
it’s solitude for purposes of rest, to then re-engage with society
again.  To be locked up inside that concrete cube, without contact
with other human beings, is deeply anti-human.  It penetrates right
into your soul and produces a level of depression, alienation, and
absurdity, that you begin to wonder: what are these words “free-
dom” and “justice?”  What are they all about?  The concepts be-
come remote.  You wonder: why am I suffering so much, why is life
so horrible and miserable?  And it goes on and on and on, and you
never know when it’s going to end because you are totally in the
hands of other people who determine everything about you, when
you eat, when you sleep, when you see the sky.
I tried to keep myself active.  One challenge was to go through
all the states of the United States of America.  It was a mental activ-
ity, so that Albie would be communicating with Albie if he couldn’t
communicate with anybody else.  And I would do Alabama, I would
say Ar-kansas . . . and I think I got up to something like forty-three
or forty-six states.  Even though this was before I was blown up and
still had ten fingers, I wasn’t able to write it all down, I didn’t have
pencil and paper, and in any event it might be invidious today to
mention the states that I forgot.  I would sing songs, and again go
2008] KEYNOTE 203
through the alphabet, coming up with an interesting profile of the
hit tunes of late 1963.  I would start with “Always,” “Because,”
“Charmaine,” “Daisy,” and so on.  I had trouble with the letter “x”
so I sang “Deep in the Heart of Texas.”  You laugh to yourself, and
you weep a bit to yourself because you are going through these
childish things just to feel human.  My favorite was “Always,”
[singing]
“I’ll be living here always,
year after year, always,
in this little cell,
that I know so well,
I’ll be living swell always, always.”
And I would do a lonely waltz and be amused that this Noel
Coward song taken from Irving Berlin, was helping the freedom
struggle in South Africa.
“I’ll be staying in always,
keeping up my chin always,
not for but an hour, not for but a week,
not for ninety days, but always.”
Ninety days, that was the name of the law: the Ninety Day Law.
It said you could be locked up in solitary confinement for ninety
days, released for a few minutes, and then locked up for another
ninety days.  And our top courts declared that this was okay.  And
another ninety days, and another ninety days.  It turned out to be
168 days in my case.  So, being called a terrorist was not simply
being branded with an ugly label.  It had dire consequences for the
hundreds and thousands of us that were locked up.  As “terrorists,”
we lived outside the world of the rule of law, there was no due
process.  The people who make all decisions about your health,
your life, your safety, and your future, were the police.  Torture
takes place and violence takes place.  Months later you might ap-
pear in court, with no visible signs of injury, no broken bones that
are visible, the wounds have healed, and the judges look and won-
der what the problem is?  They see a timid and insecure prisoner in
the witness box or a witness who has been tortured to testify against
somebody else, as opposed to the confident and assured security
police who deny that anything untoward has happened.  Anxious
about the threat of terrorism in society, the judges are only too
ready to disbelieve these “wild” allegations being made by the de-
tainees.  So this certainly was one reason why we felt that the label
of “terrorist” was something ignoble, inappropriate, and wounding,
as well as a cover for security police brutality.
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But there was a stronger reason for our hatred of the word.
The ANC had in fact taken a stand against terrorism.  This was a
deep moral issue inside the organization.  I remember when we
were in exile and the Palestinian Black September Movement was
active in hijacking airplanes.  Young ANC members were saying to
the leadership: what’s the matter with you?  They criticized Oliver
Tambo,1 with his briefcase and his glasses, “you’re just a lawyer,
you’re too scared to take these kind of actions, what kind of leader
are you . . .  look at the huge publicity Black September is getting,
putting their struggle on the map, the whole world is talking about
it, are we just too timid, too lawyer-like, have we spent too many
years preaching non-violence, to really grasp these opportunities
and do what the struggle requires?” But the leadership was very,
very firm. No terrorism.
That was a period of “isms.”  There was imperialism, socialism,
communism, fascism, and, from the past, Nazism.  One of the
“isms” was terrorism.  We took “isms” very, very seriously; if you
were accused of the wrong “ism” in your particular movement, you
could be in big ideological trouble.  The basis for the challenge to
terrorism was partly pragmatic.  You never know who might be on
that airplane; it could be Oliver Tambo himself, or people support-
ing our struggle, because terrorism was indiscriminate in that way.
Another concern was that adopting terrorist forms of struggle
would play into the hands of the Apartheid government.  It would
support the claim that the whites in South Africa would face anni-
hilation, that this was simply a battle between black and white, not
between justice and injustice.
But I believe there was a much deeper and more profound
reason for rejecting terrorism that went beyond fears of how its
indiscriminate impact could be used to distort the nature of the
struggle.  It concerned what it does to you.  It’s what it does to the
freedom fighters.  When you become an instrument of death,
when you don’t care about human life, then you are destroying the
very heart of your struggle, the very foundation of the claim to life
and dignity that gives you the courage to withstand all the difficul-
ties and the trauma and imbues you with a sense of solidarity and
connection with other people.  It’s profoundly destructive of your
ethos, of who you are, and of your struggle.
1 Oliver Reginald Tambo was a South African anti-Apartheid leader and activist.
Tambo was a central figure in the ANC and held various posts including Secretary
General, Deputy President, President, and National Chairperson. Together with Nel-
son Mandela and Walter Silsulu, he was one of the founding members of the ANC
Youth League.
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Even if the ANC leadership didn’t always expressly spell out
these deeper philosophical factors, I know that when it came to
someone like Oliver Tambo, such beliefs lay at the core of a princi-
pled opposition to terrorism.  He was always aware that when you
embark upon an indiscriminate war, of one group against another,
of one community against another, and not of people fighting
against a system of injustice and oppression, then the struggle be-
comes endlessly bitter.  You can rebuild broken buildings, but it is
far harder to repair bitter minds.
In 1985 we held a conference of the ANC in exile in a small
town in Zambia called Kabwe.  The conference was organized to
make important decisions about intensifying the struggle while
pursuing the possibilities of negotiations, the two being seen as
connected.  We were surrounded by Zambian troops because there
had been commando raids conducted by the South African govern-
ment to kill ANC members in Zambia.  And with a couple hundred
delegates in attendance, we discussed what were called “methods of
struggle.”
I recall vividly King Sabata Dalindyebo going up to the plat-
form and addressing the delegates.  Comrade King, as we called
him, was one of the patriotic traditional leaders who had refused to
become a stooge of Pretoria and accept its little benefits, like a
motor car and stipend.  He came to Mozambique where I was in
exile and I was asked to look after him and his family.  One day I
took them to the beach and had the delight of lending him my
bathing costume—I had never lent my swimming costume to a
King before.
He goes up to the platform and he speaks in isiXhosa, his na-
tive tongue.  I notice the audience is laughing as he speaks.  The
oppressed people have to know the language of the oppressors; yet
if you belong to the privileged community you don’t have to know
the language of the oppressed.  So I, being one of about ten per-
cent of the audience who were culturally backwards and didn’t un-
derstand isiXhosa, had to wait for the translation, and ten minutes
later we were able to laugh.
This was the story he told: two men were fighting with sticks,
viciously, very angry with each other.  Their wives were watching
and urging them on.  And the one wife said to her husband:
[M]y darling husband, you know that you are a better fighter
than your opponent, you are stronger than him, you’ve always
beaten him.  But today you are losing.  And why?  It is because
you are using only one hand to grasp the stick, while the other
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hand is holding a blanket to cover your nakedness. Forget your
damn nakedness—drop your blanket, and smash him up!
People laughed.  We saw the analogy.  He was saying that the
ANC was unduly restricting itself in its methods of struggle and
preventing itself from achieving victory.  In doing so, he was echo-
ing what some were saying in the corridors: until the whites bury
their children like we bury our children, until they feel the pain
that we feel, they will never give way.  The response of the audience
was simply to engage in polite laughter, and then to move on.  I
would have stood up and in grave tones said, “Comrade King, the
policy of the ANC for many years has been to negate terroristic
tendencies in the organization . . . blah, blah . . . .”  The African
way is through quiet laughter to project the response that we hear
you out, we respect what you are saying, we understand the inten-
sity of your emotions and feelings, but in fact our policy will stay on
course.  So this was reaffirmation that we didn’t go for civilian
targets, for soft targets.  We simply continued with a political strug-
gle that had an armed component that directly targeted structures
of domination and control, but didn’t go for people simply be-
cause they happened to belong to the oppressor community, even
if these people had voted for oppression, and given support in dif-
ferent ways to oppression.
Another issue discussed was the question of what to do with
captives in the hands of the ANC.  I was working in Mozambique as
the Director of Research in the Ministry of Justice when I got a
telephone call one day from Oliver Tambo.  I was always pleasantly
amused that if Oliver Tambo wanted me to come and see him, he
would ask me in the most polite roundabout way—I know that
you’re extremely busy, if it would help I can speak to President
Samora Machel to facilitate your absence, and if you can’t come, I
would fully understand.  A junior official of the ANC would say:
Comrade Albie, you are expected in Greenland next week, prepare
a ten page written speech about the situation in South Africa.  But
that was not part of Oliver Tambo’s style, and he invited me to
come if I could possibly manage it to Lusaka to help with some-
thing he said was rather important.
I was curious to know what it was that he couldn’t mention on
the phone.  I arrived on a hot day in 1983, and the President of the
ANC in exile was using a piece of rolled-up newspaper to swat flies
while he got to this very important matter.  Eventually, after going
through the courtesies of welcome, he told me what the problem
was.  Pretoria was trying hard to destroy the ANC, sending people
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to kill the leadership and to create every kind of mayhem inside
the organization.  A number of these operatives had been cap-
tured.  The question was that there were no rules or regulations
dealing with what to do with the captives.  Ours was a purely politi-
cal organization, not a State, and its constitution dealt with annual
meetings, elections, subscriptions, and the policy of the organiza-
tion.  It didn’t touch on what was in effect a code of criminal law
and criminal procedure.
We don’t know what to do, he concluded, and did I have any
advice?  I confidently replied that it wasn’t very difficult at all; there
were international instruments that said that all torture or cruel
and inhuman punishment or treatment were prohibited.  He was
quiet for a moment and then said: “we use torture.”  I almost
fainted.  He said the words with a bleak face and didn’t give any
further explanation.  Years later I learned that there had been alle-
gations that ANC security had been using very brutal methods
against these captives in ANC camps in Angola, where the circum-
stances had been very difficult.  Tambo had then established a
Commission of Inquiry comprised of senior ANC members, who
had interviewed people and given him a report confirming that
torture had in fact been used.  All I discovered at that moment was
that he wanted me to prepare a draft of what he called a “Code of
Conduct” for the ANC.
Of all the legal writing I have done, and it has been quite a lot
over many decades, I would say that the Code of Conduct I drafted
is second only in significance to a tiny note I sent out of prison
when I was detained.  During that detention, I was subjected to
sleep deprivation and just kept awake for hours and hours on end,
with drugs probably put in my food.  When I collapsed on to the
floor, I just remember the shoes of the security police moving ur-
gently around me, some black, some brown.  The voices above all
were staccato.  I was lifted up, fingers pushed open my eyelids, I felt
water pouring on to me.  And it happened again and again.  My
body was wrestling with my intelligence, and I felt myself weaken-
ing and weakening.  Afterwards, I smuggled a little note out on a
tiny piece of paper trying in just two sentences to say what had
happened to me hoping that the matter would go to court.  That is
the most important legal document I have ever written.
Second in importance is the Code of Conduct, which was in
effect a code of criminal procedure and criminal law for a libera-
tion movement in exile, establishing the rule of law, principles of
legality, of human rights, inside the organization itself.  Oliver
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Tambo’s approach was not simply to sign off as President on the
Code of Conduct and declare it to be the policy of the organiza-
tion.  Rather, he insisted that it go to a mandated delegates’ confer-
ence, because an issue like this had to become a theme thought
through and embraced by the whole movement.
So for months before the conference, one of the issues dis-
cussed by scattered ANC branches throughout the world was the
question of the adoption of the Code of Conduct.  Basically the
code established three levels of offense.  The first level dealt with
the obstreperous member who goes to a branch meeting drunk,
who messes up discussions and who doesn’t respect the chair.  You
don’t use detention against someone like that, or other heavy re-
sponses, but you do have to have some kind of discipline and con-
trol.  The second level was for people who would crash vehicles
while they were drunk, or stab somebody, or steal, or abuse women
or men in the organization.  We needed some form of penalty to
address that sort of behavior.  Finally, the most serious level related
to treatment of people sent in to try to destroy the organization.
The Code provided for three corresponding tiers of investiga-
tion.  At the first level, there was just a branch disciplinary inquiry.
At the second, there would be an ad hoc tribunal and at the third,
a very special and more permanently established tribunal.  There
would be a right to defense, to know the charge, to challenge and
bring evidence, and have independent representation, even
though the legal defenders would be ANC members, they would be
quite independent from the structures of security.  There would be
the normal onus of proof on the presenter—we didn’t use the
word “prosecutor”—to establish with a very high degree of cer-
tainty that the person was responsible, followed by various levels of
penalties.  And finally, there would be a right of appeal.
The big question was what to do in what people called “ex-
treme situations,” where a battle was raging and there might be
somebody with information that might be extremely potent and
significant.  Should a measure of “intensive investigation” be per-
mitted?  Variants of that phrase were used at the conference.
Should some form of intense investigation be permitted in situa-
tions of extreme pressure where there was reason to believe that
the captive might have crucial information?  And one by one, dele-
gates came up to the platform and said “No.”  I still remember that
most of those who spoke were young soldiers from Umkhonto we
Sizwe,2 and they said no.  They said that the minute you gave the
2 Umkhonto we Sizwe, translated as “Spear of the Nation,” was the military wing of
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slightest leeway to interrogators, it would get used for all interroga-
tions, all the time.  I remember one delegate saying: we are fighting
for life—how can we be against life?  Life, not just meaning being
dead or alive, but giving respect for the human spirit and for
humanity.
It was a thrilling moment for me.  It represented what I
thought, and I’m sure, what Oliver Tambo thought.  It became
clear that the Code of Conduct represented something that the
movement as a whole and the rank and file felt strongly about.
There was overwhelming rejection of any kind of special interroga-
tion techniques.  What was understood was, torture is torture is tor-
ture, something abhorrent and something disrespectful to who we
were.  Anything that opened the door, the tiniest little crack, to
permit torture, was to be excluded.  So, the Code of Conduct was
adopted with overwhelming support, and it did not allow for any
exceptional forms of interrogation in even the most necessitous
circumstances.
I was not in the armed struggle.  My friend Denis Goldberg
was.  He was good with his hands, so he ended up in Umkhonto we
Sizwe, and spent twenty-three years of his life in Pretoria Prison.  I
was a lawyer and that was my function.  I was good at talking, yack,
yack, yack.  But the armed struggle came to me.  And it did so in the
form of State terrorism.  State terrorism is not often discussed in
debates on terrorism.  Yet, States have been responsible for more
indiscriminate killings and more violations of human rights than
any irregular groups, certainly in my lifetime.  In addition to hav-
ing the power to assimilate, State terrorists have the power to im-
pose silence—the power to cover up, to a far greater extent than
any irregular groups might have.
I was blown up by a bomb in Mozambique.  I was just one of
millions who had been traumatized over the decades, whose bodies
had been violated, and whose spirits had been placed on the wrack
by State violence.  Our response was not to demand an eye for an
eye.  While I was recovering in the hospital, I remember a letter
someone sent me saying, “don’t worry, Comrade Albie, we will
avenge you.”  I wrote back thanking him, but meanwhile I
thought—do you mean you’re going to chop off the right arms of
the people who did this to me, and blind them in one eye?  What
kind of a country will we produce?  Who will we be?  But if we get
the ANC. In August of 1990, Umkhonto we Sizwe ceased operations in anticipation of
the end of Apartheid, and was fully integrated into the South African National De-
fence Force by 1994.
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democracy in South Africa, that will be my soft vengeance.  Later, I
heard that one of the persons responsible had actually been cap-
tured in Mozambique.  I remember thinking, and later recounting
in my book Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter,3 if he’s put on trial in
Mozambique and the evidence is insufficient and he is acquitted,
that will be my soft vengeance.  What was important was to live in a
country where the rule of law and due process operated.  Achiev-
ing democracy and the rule of law in South Africa, rather than put-
ting some rascal behind bars—possibly unfairly—that would be my
soft vengeance.
That happened to be my personal kind of response, but it also
became a national response in the sense of creating a law-governed
process that required the perpetrators of torture or violence on all
sides to come forward and acknowledge what they’d done.  The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) was set up so that
the country could move forward without lies and deceit.  We could
recover the bodies of people who had been secretly buried and
families could know how the victims had died and give them a de-
cent burial at last.4  The public character of the proceedings ena-
bled our whole society to convert knowledge (such as facts, data,
information) into acknowledgement (appreciation) that everyone
could embrace the values and ask:  Where was I?  What could I
have done?  What can we do in the future to prevent this?  That
whole process, a very rich, complicated, controversial process, was
our kind of response.  We rejected the idea of doing unto them
what they had done onto us.  We didn’t want to become like them.
And that brings me to the last part of this presentation.  Now
Albie is wearing a green robe, together with ten colleagues at the
Constitutional Court.5  We hear several cases with one fundamental
theme: do extremely wicked people, who challenge the very no-
tions of the rule of law, of constitutionality and fundamental rights,
have the right to claim protection from the legal system that they
are trying to overthrow?  I mention three cases.
The first is that of Mr. Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who had
apparently been involved in the blowing up of the American Em-
3 ALBIE SACHS, THE SOFT VENGEANCE OF A FREEDOM FIGHTER (2d ed. David Philip
Publishers 2000) (1990).
4 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 1995 by the Gov-
ernment of National Unity to help deal with the conflict that occurred under
apartheid.  The Truth and Reconciliation Home Page, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/
(last visited September 3, 2008).
5 Constitutional Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/
site/home.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2008).
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bassy in Dar es Salaam.6  It was a terrible, terrible act.  It killed
scores of people just doing their work, a majority of them Tanzani-
ans, and it was aimed at international law as such, targeting an in-
ternational diplomatic institution.  After the bombing, Mohamed
came down to Cape Town, gave a false name, and got documenta-
tion as a political refugee.  The FBI had heard that he was there,
but they didn’t know which name he had chosen and so they
waited with a photograph for him to return one day to get his doc-
uments updated.  In the meanwhile he had taken up employment
with a baker—apparently he was a very good pastry-chef, with a
quiet demeanor.  One day, Mohamed did not turn up to work and
the owner of the bakery inquired and was told that he was in deten-
tion.  The baker tried to get a lawyer for him, but was refused per-
mission to do so.  And within thirty-six hours Mohamed was flying
in a military plane to stand trial on a capital charge in New York.
The baker went to the High Court, and the High Court said: we
can’t give you any relief, he was an illegal alien living under a false
name, he’s been deported out of the country, and there’s nothing
the court can do.
The matter was taken on appeal to the Constitutional Court.
There was absolutely no problem with the fact that Mohamed de-
served to be put on trial for what he had allegedly done.  It was a
terrible, terrible act.  There was no question that if proper proce-
dures had been followed, the South African government would
have been legally obligated to hand him over for trial.  But there
were two issues that concerned us deeply.  The first was that he had
been denied the right to legal assistance.  And it’s precisely the
people facing the most serious charges who most need legal assis-
tance.  If you’re up on a parking offense, the failure to have legal
assistance is not going to be catastrophic.  But in a matter of life or
death, the law and the constitution have to function and be seen to
function.  So our court made some sharp comments about the fail-
ure of the South African authorities to allow Mohamed access to a
lawyer.
But there was another matter of even deeper concern for us.
Our Constitution, as interpreted by our Court, forbade capital pun-
ishment.7 To hand somebody over to a country where the person
might be executed, was like handing somebody over to a country
6 Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) (S.
Afr.) available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2001/18.pdf.
7 S. AFR. CONST. § 11 (1996); S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.)
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.pdf (declaring capital pun-
ishment unconstitutional).
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where a person could face torture.  It was against our Bill of Rights.
In fact, when one of the accused in that very trial had been discov-
ered to be in Germany, the American government had approached
the German government for his extradition and the German gov-
ernment had refused to hand him over unless it got an assurance
that he wouldn’t be executed.  That assurance had been given, and
he had been handed over following due process of the law.
I felt a sense of indignation when I saw the term “rendition”
used in the papers before us.  The implication was that when it
came to Germany or other powerful countries of the West, you re-
spect the rule of law.  However, when it comes to that country at
the bottom of Africa, you go for rendition.  We battled so hard to
get our constitution, to get the rule of law in our country, and to
have due process as part and parcel of the very fabric of our soci-
ety.  Now we find South African officials collaborating with officials
from another country to disrespect and disregard the very things
that we had been fighting for.  In any event, our judgment made it
very clear that the South African immigration authorities who had
handed Mohamed over had violated his rights not to be sent to a
country where he faced the death sentence without a proper assur-
ance being given that if found guilty he would not be executed.
The question then was, what to do?  We couldn’t send a gun-
boat to sail past the Statue of Liberty to land commandos to rescue
him.  Separation of powers required that foreign affairs, and not
the Court, be responsible for dealing with the diplomatic dimen-
sions of the matter.  But what we could do and did do was to send a
copy of our judgment and position on the matter to the judge who
was presiding over the trial in the United States.8  Then the ques-
tion before him was whether or not to let the jury know what the
South African court had decided.  In any event the jury split, I be-
lieve it was seven-five, which meant Mohamed wasn’t executed.9  I
might mention the date of the [Constitutional Court] decision was
May of 2001.  If it had been a few months later . . . .
The second case involved a person who had been dubbed “Dr.
Death” by the press.10  In the late period of Apartheid, Dr. Wouter
8 Judge Leonard B. Sand, of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of
New York, presiding judge over United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F.Supp. 2d 359
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
9 United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F.Supp. 2d 359, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
10 The State v. Wouter Basson 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC) (S. Afr.) available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/13.pdf; see also Albie Sachs, War, Violence,
Human Rights, and the Overlap between National and International Law: Four Cases before the
South African Constitutional Court, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 432 (2005).
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Basson was head of the biological and chemical warfare unit of the
South African military.11  It was alleged that he had used money
given to him to buy poisons and antidotes abroad to acquire a plea-
sure resort and hotels in South Africa in his own name.  His de-
fense was that in fact he was doing that as nominee for agents from
Libya, Russia, and East Germany because that was their kickback
for providing him with these antidotes.  The trial judge believed
that Dr. Basson’s explanation of why he had used the money in the
way that he had done could possibly be true and acquitted him of
the fraud charges.  But the most serious charge against him was
that he had employed his medical skills to create a poison which
was used to inject about 200 members of SWAPO—South West Af-
rica People’s Organization—freedom fighters from Namibia, who
were asphyxiated, taken in a small airplane and dropped over the
sea—Argentine fashion—where they drowned and were eaten by
sharks.  The judge said that because the charge was conspiracy in
South Africa to commit murder in Namibia, he didn’t have juris-
diction to hear the matter; conspiracy in Country A to commit an
offense in Country B can’t be tried in Country A, only in Country
B.
The matter went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
where the State claimed that the trial judge had been manifestly
biased in favor of the accused, and that in any event, the conspiracy
to murder charge should not have been quashed.  However, the
Supreme Court of Appeal said on procedural grounds that the
State hadn’t prepared its documents properly, so it would not en-
tertain the matter.  Then the case came to the Constitutional
Court.
We first considered a preliminary question: did the case raise a
constitutional issue, thereby giving our Court jurisdiction to hear
the appeal?  For varying reasons, all the judges held that it did.  In
a separate judgment, I said one reason why it was a constitutional
matter was that it implicated international law, specifically South
Africa’s duties both under the Geneva Conventions and under cus-
tomary international law, to prosecute what war crimes and crimes
against humanity.  Our Constitution expressly required that inter-
national law be applied in our courts,12 a factor that should have
11 Project Coast was a top-secret chemical and biological weapons program insti-
tuted by the South African government during Apartheid (1981–1993).  With the end
of Apartheid, South Africa’s various weapons of mass destruction programs were
stopped. CHANDRE GOULD & PETER FOLB, PROJECT COAST: APARTHEID’S CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME (United Nations Publications UNIDIR) (2002).
12 S. AFR. CONST. Ch. 2 Sec. 39 § 1(b) (1996).
214 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:201
been used by the Supreme Court of Appeal to weigh against the
technical faults in the application; thus, given the gravity of the
allegations, the Court should have exercised its discretion to hear
the matter, not to reject it.
My judgment detailed the horrendous offenses Dr. Basson was
alleged to have committed, but concluded with the observation
and fact that these crimes had been horrific didn’t in any way di-
minish his right to have a fair trial.  On the contrary, when dealing
with allegations that involve profound attacks against the whole no-
tion of the rule of law, democracy, and constitutionalism, it be-
comes particularly important for the prosecution to distance itself
from the cynical morality of those who allegedly seek to challenge
these concepts.  This requires resolutely defending the very quali-
ties that are most under threat.
The third and last case involved a group of mercenaries from
South Africa who were apparently on their way to Equatorial
Guinea to overthrow and kill the president of Equatorial Guinea.13
They stopped off in Harare, Zimbabwe, but the South African au-
thorities had given the Zimbabweans a tip off, and they were ar-
rested.  The case received international prominence because Mark
Thatcher, the son of former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, was alleged to have been involved, and indeed he even-
tually paid a very big admission of guilt and fine in a plea bargain
acknowledging his role, coupled with a promise never to return to
South Africa.14  It was a poignant situation.  Our courtroom, which
was much smaller than this room,15 was packed with the mothers
and the fathers, the lovers, and the brothers and sisters of the mer-
cenaries demanding that their rights be protected under the South
African Bill of Rights.  But they were not in South African soil; they
were locked up in Zimbabwe.  To what extent could we use the
South African Bill of Rights to defend and protect people who
were completely outside of the Court’s jurisdiction?  We decided
that in general terms our Bill of Rights could not be imposed on
other countries.  For example, we couldn’t say to the United States
that it could not execute a South African who had committed a
crime in the U.S. because to do so would be a violation of that
person’s rights under the South African Bill of Rights.  American
13 Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC)
(S. Afr.) available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/5.pdf.
14 Laurie Goering, Thatcher’s Son to Pay Big Fine in Plea Bargain; Admits Breaking S.
African Coup Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2005, at 4.
15 The Symposium was held at The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
42 West 44th Street New York, NY.
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law would apply, and the imposition of the death sentence would
be a matter for the U.S. Supreme Court or for the legislatures to
determine.
But that wasn’t the end of the matter.  They continued to be
South African citizens, wherever they were.  Did this give them any
claim for protection from our government?  We had to decide the
question in a hurry, reconvening during the middle of our recess—
there would be little value in a beautifully crafted but posthumous
judgment.  The allegations of the families were that they were go-
ing to be tortured, possibly in Zimbabwe, and certainly in Equato-
rial Guinea.  They quoted from documents by the International
Commission of Jurists and other organizations to prove that there
would be a show trial or no trial at all, and that they could well face
summary execution after torture.  I remember feeling the irony of
the situation and blurting out from the Bench: they go into a lion’s
den and then complain that there is a lion.  Yet for all the paradox,
we were a court committed to the principles of our Constitution,
and our Constitution respected life and the right to a fair trial for
all.
But what kind of protection could they lawfully seek?  We
couldn’t say that customary international law had abolished capital
punishment; it hadn’t reached that stage, although it was moving
in that direction.  However, we did say that the right to a fair trial
was recognized by international human rights instruments and had
become part of customary international law.  We accordingly held,
with varying degrees of firmness, that the prisoners had a right to
get what diplomatic protection they could from our foreign affairs
authorities in relation to the right to a fair trial.
Secondly, we said, they should not be subjected to torture.
The right not to be tortured, enshrined in the Convention Against
Torture, is now part of customary international law.  There were
credible allegations that the prisoners could face torture, and
again with varying degrees of forcefulness we said our foreign af-
fairs authorities were under a duty to use their best efforts to pre-
vent that from happening.  The common thrust of our different
judgments was the significance of the interface between customary
international law principles and the rights enshrined in our Bill of
Rights.  The fact that the alleged mercenaries were creating may-
hem on our continent, that they were not freedom fighters taking
up arms against their own leaders who they regarded as oppressors,
but hired guns not under any command, or subject to any disci-
pline, nor functioning within any system of legality, didn’t take
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away the fact that they were human beings.  As such, they were enti-
tled to rely on basic principles of customary international law.
Let me conclude by saying that in South Africa we have a par-
ticular constitution that came about in a particular way.  But what’s
been extremely inspiring and encouraging to me as a judge has
been to discover that judges in other countries with totally differ-
ent constitutional arrangements have stressed the importance of
the need to apply their own domestic law with respect to principles
of customary international law and fundamental human rights.  We
in South Africa are guided by a very value-rich constitutional text.
Indeed, you can’t be an originalist in South Africa, relying on the
literal text of the Constitution, without being a judicial activist.  In
the United Kingdom, there isn’t any written constitution at all, and
in the United States, you have a written constitution with a text that
is very different in many ways from ours.  Yet, it’s a matter of great
inspiration and pride for me to see that judges from different parts
of the world, working within different constitutional structures,
have all managed to uphold the same deep values.  Their judg-
ments show that the integrity of deep fundamental principles
should not be undermined simply because the pressures of the le-
gal system are great.  On the contrary, the greater the stress, the
greater the need to uphold the fundamental principles.
